

書 評

Reviews

《幻化之龍：兩千年中國歷史變遷中的孔子》，戴梅可 (Michael Nylan)、魏偉森 (Thomas Wilson) 合著，何劍葉譯，香港：香港中文大學出版社，二〇一六年，364 頁。

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由戴梅可 (Michael Nylan) 與魏偉森 (Thomas Wilson) 教授合著的《幻化之龍：兩千年中國歷史變遷中的孔子》(*Lives of Confucius: Civilization's Greatest Sage Through the Ages*) 一書，在當今中國文化熱以及儒學復興的風潮下出版，別具有意義。這個意義顯現在「孔子」作為中國文化的重要象徵，為形塑民族集體記憶 (collective memory) 和認同時的重要符號，因此，重新思考和詮釋「孔子」及其學說在學術界和文化界已成為重要課題。但探討孔子的生平及其學說的書籍、電影、電視節目以及學術研究的出版品早已汗牛充棟，為何還需要本書的撰寫呢？又或者追問：本書撰寫有何積極意義？若回到「孔子」具有重要的文化意義脈絡下來思考，此「象徵符號」在時代交替、道德意識轉化、認同危機發生時，往往首當其衝，成為被積極拉攏、改造、甚至否定的對象。在不斷召喚民族情感和形塑認同的過程中亦不容易免於國家權力的介入，以及孔子形象與學說的典範化和刻板化問題。因此，重新詮釋「孔子」及其學說，賦予「孔子」以新的活力，即成為重要的挑戰。面對這個挑戰，如何對「孔子」與其學說進行重新詮釋？以及這樣的詮釋所可能具有的創造性和意義為何？透過「孔子」形象的重新敘事能為當代的文化課題提供何種積極意義，便成為迫切需要回應的問題。在這樣的脈絡下，本書的出版便顯現出積極的意義。由戴梅可教授的中文版序言來

看，顯然作者對於本書出版所具有的時代意義，有敏銳的觀察。序言中首先由二十世紀八十年代以「孔子」為主題的「文化熱」的現象說起，指出現有的孔子相關出版品以及學術研究成果，仍然不免於對中國認同的想像，或者過分強調同化和整合不同人群的特殊目的。在此種政治正確的背景，「孔子」形象之於當今生活所具有的積極意義，以及對於政治權力所具有的批判性，便顯得模糊不清。在「孔子熱」浪潮下，既有的相關出版品容易由國族情感以及統治、秩序等考量出發，而與民族主義風潮結合。這使得當今有關「孔子」及其學說的出版品儘管很多，卻不見「眾聲喧嘩」的生動活力。而若停滯於民族主義情懷的滿足，對於相異語境、文化的對話與交流，容易流於異國情調的簡單對比和想像，難以產生真實交流與平等對話的機會。如此，孔子形象勢必逐漸走向同一化和空洞化，其於華文化語境中的創造性不易展現。在教條化的宣傳下，傳統只能停留在遙遠的過去，而與當代遙遙相對，其之於當代生活的積極意義無法被彰顯，且文化的潛力亦不容易被正視。

「孔子」形象的典範轉移和重構所具有的重大的思想活力和影響力，仍有待被深度開發。難以否認的，「孔子」在二千多年的文明發展中，扮演思想、文化中至為關鍵的地位。「天不生仲尼，萬古如長夜」，多少學者在其中受其啓發，為其感召，將自身生命與其「志於道」之人格與行誼編織在一起，實踐為學、為人的「成人」之道。錢穆先生於《天人合一——中國文化對人類未來可有的貢獻》的生前最後遺稿，以「天人合一」為中國文化對人類文明最大的貢獻。孔子之好學，以及深刻的歷史意識，使得士人在究天人之學、通古今之變深受其感召和啓發。錢穆先生所謂之「天人合一」，「天」並不獨立於「人」之外，人生即為彰顯天命的歷程；而孔子的一生即為透過「德」以彰顯「天命」的成「人」歷程之展現。若由對當代生活提供如何才是完整的「人」？以及「人」與自然、人與自身、人與人之間理想狀態為何的思考來看，作為典範人物的「孔子」其形象的格式化，將使得此象徵符號所帶來的思想活力失落，傳統文化之於當代生活的重要意義亦無法展開，將不利於傳統文化與當代處境進行連結。鑑於此，學界面對當代文化困境以及西方文化所帶來的衝擊下，重新思考原始儒家所具有的創造性意義。學者或者重談文化之源，以回復儒學的思想活力；或者由治療名言與禮儀所可能導致的僵化和暴力角度進行批判，或者透過跨文化的角度，重談華語世界的「混雜性」和思想潛能。或者重新思考和探討孔子思想的重要關鍵詞，如仁、禮、誠、忠、恕……等的當代意義。或者由生活世界、身體、感受性層面重新思

考禮學與工夫實踐課題。這些面對當前文化處境而進行的思想努力中，「孔子」及其學說一直居於重要位置。再者，就孔子與當權者的關係來看，其顛沛流離的一生，對「士人」在抉擇其出仕、入仕、行止出處時，產生極大的情感興發。在孔子過世後的二千多年間，其言行事蹟不斷被追述，但也不斷被典範化，乃至於成為廟堂之上的受尊崇者。但在當權者對「孔子」進行推崇，以拉攏和控制士人，以使「孔子」與官學、禮儀祀典進行結合的同時，雖使得儒學者能於廟堂之上實踐經世濟民的理想，卻也使得儒學之於政道、治道的相關激進主張和批判性被淹沒。也正因為如此，重新詮釋古典文本，釋放孔子形象中可能的不同視角的典範轉移工作，對於重新思考和活化當代文化生活，以及追問何謂理想的「成人之道」，乃至於對於政治權力上所具有的批判性，具有重要的意義。有關儒學與政治的關係，以及儒學之於當代生活所具有的批判性，日本學者東京大學東洋文化研究所中島隆博教授在研究儒學所具有的東亞思想的現代化以及批判性時就提出：「批判儒教」、「透過儒教的批判，回復儒教的批判性」的說法（〈儒教、現代性、公民精神〉）。透過孔子形象的重新敘事以及其學說的新詮，將能帶來重要的批判力量。如就孔子一生與當權者間的游離關係以及在逆境中的出處應對，重新敘事其「丘也，東西南北之人」的游牧過程，其當代「知識分子」形象就可能被呈現出來。而這種重新敘事，對於活化當今流於「常規化」的孔子，或是簡化和輕鬆化的孔子形象，具有反動和深化的可能。這種「反動」和「深化」，有助於活化經典，使得當今在思考國族、社會、文化問題，乃至於何謂「有意義」的生活、如何成為理想的「人」、禮樂文化之於當代生活的意義……等問題時，提供新的思考方向和潛能。

本書作者戴梅可為美國加州大學柏克萊分校歷史系教授，研究中國早期思想史、中國藝術與考古學。而魏偉森為美國漢密爾頓學院歷史系教授，其研究領域包括中國歷史、文化和宗教、儒家禮儀、祭祀等層面。本書並非單純的孔子傳記，二位所進行的孔子形象敘事，頗能映照東西文化之間對「孔子」的不同態度。在其為孔子「除魅」、「脫冕」的過程中，孔子從神壇上走下，成為一個具有血肉和氣性的存在。其在逆境中的困惑與掙扎，也如同你我。而在「有限性」中的「無限性」，則成為「學者」為學的重要鼓舞和啟發。也由於沒有神化孔子的「包袱」，跳脫儒釋道三教競合的學術背景，並在「西方」學術背景和專業的既外又內的觀照中，作者自覺避免用「略帶異域的眼光」，避免異國情調的想像的覺察下，其所呈現的孔子之道德形象與主張，與傳統的孔子傳記頗為不同。本

書對於孔子「道德」之理解，也與西方如康德 (Immanuel Kant) 對「道德」的解釋頗為不同，並與宋明理學所強調的本體心性及體用工夫徑路不同。其強調深刻的洞察力和豐富的想像力，強調「好學」而於人倫日用中實踐「成人」之道的孔子。此種既生又熟、既內又外的角度，有助於讀者重新思考「孔子」及學說中，其重視實踐、重視倫理性，回到生活世界，回到文化、藝術、歷史、倫理處境而言仁、禮之道。這對於東、西方的讀者在思考道德等相關課題，應會帶來重視歷史文化、倫理世界的積極意義，並帶起「志於道」的工夫實踐與轉化，和以深刻感受性為工夫基礎的生活實踐之道。

本書副標題既名為「兩千年文化變遷中的孔子」，顯然作者對於「孔子形象」於不同的政治、社會、文化脈絡中，如何被具體的「深描」(thick description) 而非使用單義、同一之詞語有所覺察。這使得其所傳達的孔子形象和學說的建構過程具有詮釋學 (hermeneutics) 的視域，而非僅是對所謂「事實」進行挖掘。當讀者由處身情境與作者和作品進行對話、溝通時，孔子形象也在此過程中，被有機的生長和建構。因此，本書透過不同的時代和文化背景，以呈現六種「不同的孔子」形象：「作為批評對象的孔子；在漢代地位無比崇高的孔子；作為孔氏家族一員的孔子；一位學行深厚、深諳大道的超級聖人；一位在明清時期被頂禮膜拜的孔子；還有當下令人混淆的、被政治化了的孔子」（頁 33）。本書並且追問：「是否曾經有一位真正的孔子？」然而何謂「真正」的孔子？一旦破除了對於唯一真實的孔子形象的追求，孔子的形象如何在不同的文化和政治脈絡中被塑造，就呈現出學統與政統間複雜的互動關係。而本書作者清楚意識孔子形象「被馴服」以適應後來不同時代的需求（頁 33），其原本極激進的觀點也在「被馴服」的脈絡下被「常規化」了。

本書第一章〈《史記》和《論語》中的孔子〉，透過說故事的方式以及活潑的筆法，將孔子從聖人的殿堂上拉回人間世界，並賦予其人性的脈絡。其成長、為學的奮鬥痕跡，其氣質、性情的限制被鮮明凸顯，也使得孔子形象變得活潑而親切。雖然有些部分或許有些渲染太過的情形，如言孔子內心世界時，謂「這個年幼的孔子是如此孤單，他甚至試圖與他毫無所知的祖先交流。他的正常社交能力是如此缺乏，只能努力塑造自己，成為一系列儀式的主祭者」（頁 12），「正常社交能力的缺乏」顯然是作者由史書的記載，如《史記·孔子世家》「孔子為兒嬉戲，常陳俎豆，設禮容」推論而來。又如其中過於強調急於入仕的孔子形象，如第十八頁甚至出現：「孔子已經為有朝一日能登堂拜相準備得太久，以

致忘記了爲什麼要爲自己的國家效力。」第二十二頁由孔子理想無法在魯國實現，推論：「孔子是否太快地轉向其他政治勢力呢？或者，更爲根本的是，他是否忽視了自己關於『恕』的訓誡呢？」如此的描述，雖然可以鮮明呈現在自然脈絡下人性之於權力的誘惑有其脆弱面，但前文所謂希望孔子形象重構所具有的批判性，其與政權關係所具有的批判意義，則不免於被削弱。又如第三十四頁引《孟子·滕文公上》孔子死後，子游等學生以「有若似聖人」，「欲以所事孔子事之」，曾子表達反對的相關記載。此部分作者理解爲「他的門人在他死後不久，就想師事他人」，亦缺乏對於師生之情誼的同情理解。〈滕文公〉記述此事乃在弟子爲孔子服喪三年後，因爲「思孔子而不可復見」，故子夏、子張、子游欲以「貌似孔子」的有若慰藉思念，曾子深以爲不可，所要凸顯的正是師生深厚的情誼。這於〈檀弓〉記載「子夏喪子而喪其明」，曾子哀弔，責備子夏「使西河之民疑女於夫子」，亦可以看出弟子間以道義相扶持的學風，同時看出弟子間欲傳孔子之道的深厚情感，這分深刻的信念於之後儒學的傳播具有關鍵意義。

事實上，孔子的氣質和稟性於孔子還在世時，即已某些程度被神聖化，此部分或許可以透過其時對於「聖」之想法進行理解。但這與漢代以後透過官學而被大幅神化的孔子又極不同，反映了其時對於人性和才性的思考，也能凸顯孔子強調「學」的特殊意義。整體來說，本章透過平易的敘述使得在經典化過程中被去除了人性之掙扎與弱點的孔子，終於回到了平實面目。其爲學、變化氣質，參究天地人極的「成人」之歷程，終而使其成爲完美的「人」。

本書第二章〈孔子和他的批評者〉，以平易的方式呈現先秦諸子之學與儒學的競合關係，以及孔子形象在各家斷章取義的批評和詮釋中被重塑的過程。本章涉及人性、倫理，以及何謂公平、愛人等爲學的根本問題之討論。孟子、荀子、墨子、楊朱、莊子、莊子同時代或其後學者對於孔子言行的討論，使得孔子一直處於學術的核心地位。而這些根本問題一直到今日思考傳統文化之於民主、自由的意義爲何？「社會」如何進行公平的分配？何謂愛人？教化如何可能？以及以何種方式進行教化？仍然深具啓發性。這些提問和思考，可以重新活化儒學的思想活力。事實上，清末民初的學者對於孔子之仁、禮學說如何啣現代化課題，以及儒學與政治、宗教的關係，皆有所反省和立論。當代學者在思考傳統文化如何面對現當代政治、社會課題時：儒學是否是保守主義？其與社會主義的關係爲何？其與自由、民主的關係爲何？《六經》傳統之於當代生活的意義爲何？《大學》、《中庸》中如絜矩、中和之道如何解釋？其於當代生活中與其他文化對

話，是否具有積極意義？〈禮運〉的大同理想為何？也仍然是關鍵課題。

本書第三章〈孔子：素王〉，透過漢代的政治及學術環境，說明孔子被神化以及透過官、學而建立祀典的過程。本書作者指出「孔子的形象曾經不時地被王朝召喚，但只是作為非凡的人物神的一員來支持漢朝統治」（頁96），統治階層透過儒術來提升漢王朝神聖性與合法性。本部分引用了不少緯書，乃至於如晉朝王嘉《拾遺記·周靈王》等文獻，以顯現漢時孔子感蒼龍之精而生的傳說，以及孔子被認為具有預知能力等神聖事蹟的建構過程。如果學究氣一點的說，此部分在引文和詮釋上，略有些問題，後代志怪等相關傳說是否能表達漢人文化氛圍和觀點也不無可疑。以及引《孔叢子·雜訓》「當免不免，當吊不吊，有司罰之」，而將「免」解為「媿禮」（頁123），明顯錯誤。「免」指服喪，其訓解當如《左傳》僖公十五年「使以免服衰絰逆且告」，杜預注解：「免、衰、絰，遭喪之服。」這些小地方如能加以注意，相信對於本書的說服力能夠更加提升。又如第四章在探討《中庸》之祭祖與天的關係，中文譯本「昊天上帝」理解「天」(High God)，以解釋郊社之禮（頁145），顯然受到漢代以後學者註解的影響，能否反映《中庸》中的「天」之意蘊，也值得重新思考。

第四章至第六章為魏偉森教授所撰。由於魏偉森教授專研於禮儀、祭祀部分，因此特別關注於尊孔祭典在官方祭典中的沿革，以及祭祀等級秩序所反映的神靈系統與統治權力的互動關係、透過祭祀而取得統治權威的合法性、等級秩序的神聖化等過程。第五章說明文廟和科舉考試如何成為王朝宣揚帝國正統信仰的關鍵場所和途徑。透過祭孔儀式和文廟制度、考試制度的相互結合，使得經典教義被神聖化、經典解釋被單一化。崇祀孔子、科舉考試以及官員任命密切結合而成為一種權力複製的模式。儒門教義被進一步正典化，透過崇祀和配祀系統，文廟祭祀傳統成為國家正統信仰。第六章則透過曲阜的孔氏家族的祭祖，以說明孝道的宗教性和實踐的意義。本章以十分鮮活而充滿感受性的文筆，透過「歷史的想像」，情意性和情境性的描述孔子的七十一世孫孔昭煥主持孔氏家族的祭祖儀式過程，說明在祭孔儀式中如何透過回憶祖先的行誼而進入深刻的歷史意識與存在感受中，這同時也是自我意識與歷史意識深度的結合。孔氏的家族祭祀以及官方的孔廟祭祀，正好展現了王朝統治與先祖信仰、公與私、親親與尊尊的完美結合。這過程被視為孝道的公共化，齊家與平天下理想之展現。而儒學與官方祀典、廟學制度的結合，也提供了思考儒學與統治權力的關係，以及對儒學宗教化的批判和反思之背景。

本書第四章〈漢至宋傳說中的孔聖人〉，說明由漢至宋作為經典意義下的孔子，涉及了儒學中重要關鍵詞（如中、和、誠的訓解）在漢代以至於宋代理學思想中的流變，並說明《中庸》的「君子之道」在鄭玄與朱熹注解中的不同。鄭玄指「君子」為「君王」，朱熹則解為「理想的士大夫」，透過訓解文本的差異，來說明二者所抱持著對治道與教化的不同的態度和主張。其中尤以《中庸》所涉及中、和、誠如何解釋，牽涉到對「聖人」的理解，以及人性論、工夫論等重要學術議題的探討。朱熹解釋《中庸》具有形上學的立場，對於人性的理解，也從天理所賦予之本心性體加以理解，「天理」成為善的根源，而性體由天理所賦予，是普遍、不變的善性。其並以尊德性之「存心」與「道問學」之「致知」為修身工夫的關鍵處。漢、宋之學者註解《中庸》的不同，是儒學中極為核心的關鍵問題，這牽動了工夫修養的實踐取徑，同時也展開了回應佛、老等學術視域和背景。而這些議題，事實上也牽動著由宋明以降至清代，經學論題中有關「由理入禮」甚至「以禮代理」的學術議題和經典詮釋之轉向。在面對「格物致知」之參究天理的體用論架構，以及對晚明心學流弊的反省，回到人倫日用的禮儀實踐工夫中。有關此工夫實踐和經典詮釋之轉向，學者楊儒賓《異議的意義——近世東亞的反理學思潮》一書，透過相偶論儒學對於體用論儒學的反思和轉化，以重新思考儒學在當代文化中的實踐方式和意義。置於當今東西文化對話的背景中，關於形上學的預設和轉化等相關討論，仍具有重要的學術意義。

本書透過歷史、文化的變遷，展現具體而多面的孔子。讓讀者能看見「孔子」形象被典範化的過程，以及在不同的時代和文化脈絡、學派競爭中，「孔子」及其學說如何回應每個不同的生存之處境。當權者又如何透過文官及考試升遷系統與文廟祭祀制度的結合，進行儒學經典的正典化、孔子形象的典範化、統治階層的神聖化等過程。這同時也展現了學者在深度的文化、歷史意識中，如何將自身公共化的努力。由於活潑的敘事風格以及豐富的歷史想像力，使得本書在對「孔子」形象和學說進行重新詮釋的同時，多了許多情意性的體會，以及各詮釋間豐富編織和對話的可能性。

The Dao of Translation: An East-West Dialogue. By Douglas Robinson, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2015. Pp. xiv+242.

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This book sets up an East-West dialogue, specifically between ancient Chinese thought and more recent Western theories about language and translation. The dialogue, as I read it, is a theory that consists of a Chinese skeleton fleshed out with Western theories. The skeleton, the notions of Dao 道 and 無爲 *wuwei* (lit. “no action”) from the *Daodejing* 道德經, is traditionally understood as a mystical unknown force and its way of doing things—i.e. not acting or not intervening, and allowing things to become complete by themselves. Based on such understanding, I divide my reading of this book into two parts: discussions of Dao and *wuwei* style/conception of translation.

I. The demystified Dao

The author maintains the traditional understanding that Dao is something unknown and underlying all things. Yet, by following Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall’s interpretation of ancient Chinese philosophical texts, he suggests further that “Dao is habit or the functioning of collectivized habit in society—and, for cosmic progressivists like Charles Sanders Peirce, the functioning of collectivized habit in *everything*” (p.192).

Dao or habit is a collective and intergenerational socioecology that runs through cultural bodies, shaping and shaped by groups and the individuals within. It is social because it carries, and is carried by, the group opinions in a society, from individual to individual, from generation to generation. It is considered ecological, for it evolves along with the differences and surprises introduced by individuals and generations. As a collective habit so deeply ingrained in a group’s mind that it is preconscious for the individuals in society, Dao remains something unknown yet it is *not* considered unknowable as traditional interpretation suggests.

To further unravel the apprehension of Dao as habit, the author consults Peirce’s thinking on habit (Chapter 4), Ferdinand de Saussure’s ideas of the structuring force in/of language (Chapter 5), Pierre Bourdieu’s opinions on habitus (Chapter 6), and Antonio Damasio’s somatic-marker theory (Chapter 6).

Habit, as Peirce sees it, is the collection of past experiences which have formed general laws that ground our thinking in determining one idea after another. Since habit is internalized by each individual, it “is an automated reasoning process without an active ‘I’...so that things seem to happen without being willed, without apparent agency.’ ‘Action without effort,’ or 無爲 *wuwei*” (p.90). For Peirce, habit has an evolutionary tendency to grow, for it encounters and encompasses surprises and transfers the surprises into a new and adjusted habit. To him, what we feel as “instinct”

in abduction/hypothesizing is actually habit whose history has been developing too long to be remembered.

The lengthy formation of such developed habit, the author theorizes, requires preconscious transmission of experiential thought across generations. This is where Saussure comes into the picture. In Saussure's view on language, linguistic entities have no objective existence, for they are simply human constructs from specific points of view, with particular contexts. It is in the course of transmission from person to person, from generation to generation that the association of signs and their corresponding thoughts is decontextualized and that the illusion of stability is created. For the author, an important formative force behind the illusion that language is real and stable is "the intergenerational transmission of a preconscious intensity of experiential thought built up by previous generations of users" (p.126). This implies that language is transmitted, not propositionally but somatically, by (social and intergenerational) habits which slowly change over time. The author thus thinks of language as a socioaffective ecology.

While Saussure considers such transmission force secret and unknown, the author explains it via *icosis* and *ecosis*, two theoretical coinages which represent different social ecologies in this book: *icosis* as "the group normative plausibilization of opinion as reality and truth" (p. 193) and *ecosis* as "the valencing of behaviors and attitudes first as honorable, then as good or just" (p. x). *Icosis* seems to draw the author's special attention. It is the process of collectively and affectively stabilizing what "the group collectively considers to be normatively true and therefore real" (p. 136). To make a group, the target culture, adopt a term is to inculcate the term in the group "in what Saussure calls parasômes or what Peirce (CP 5.478-476) would call emotional-becoming-energetic-becoming-logical interpretants: what the members of the target culture *feel* to be reality" (p.137). In this sense, *icosis* is an ecology in the sense that it represents the process of stabilization and transmission of the "reality" that a group has formed, guided, and regulated from generation to generation. *Icosis* is somatic for it is experienced phenomenologically by each of the group members through "sensations, feeling, affective qualia, sômes" (p.136).

The inculcation referred to above involves three kinds of stabilizations: the stabilizations of a word-using in the source culture, of remotely related equivalents in the target culture, and of the target culture's reception of those equivalents. The author suggests that habit is the "psychological or phenomenological 'mechanism' by which all three of these stabilizations function" and that habitus is that which forms habits. Bourdieu (1967) developed Erwin Panofsky's (1964) term habitus as "a *system* of dispositions active in the 'fields' in any society" (p.143). It "guides the disposition-formation process, involving 'a gradual process of inculcation'" (p.144). Bourdieu thinks of habitus as embodied because transmission of habitus passes through body language, the *ways* of speaking (*les manières de parler*), instead of verbal language (*la parole*) or the abstract structure of language (*la langue*). Habitus works through our feeling and internalizing social pressures to behave in a certain way. These pressures

are what the author calls “kinesthetic-becoming-affective-becoming-conative-becoming-cognitive: a certain felt way of moving (kinesthesia) through the world awakens feeling (affects), which are experienced as pressures (conations), which may or may not be verbalized as thoughts or instructions or explanations (cognitions)...” (pp. 144-145).

As it is in a preverbal/preconscious way that habitus presses on individual social actors, habitus—habit-forming force—is as “secret” as “unknown” Dao. Yet, we can make use of Damasio’s somatic-marker hypothesis to explain the mechanism of this embodied, preverbal and preconscious habitus: body automatism.

According to Damasio, even a patient who constantly forgets everything still has nonconscious preferences related to emotions and “the nonconscious reinduction of some part of those emotions” on previous encounters of which the patient has no memory. Such nonconscious emotional tropisms and antitropisms form the core of Damasio’s somatic-marker hypothesis, “according to which our autonomic nervous system marks certain experiences somatically as positive or negative” (p.158). Damasio uses the term “somatic” because the feeling is about the body and uses the term “marker” to indicate the function of marking an image. This mechanism of body automatism contributes tremendously to our decision-making by sorting out considerable quantities of details which “pure reason” would otherwise have to work through. Some patients with damaged brains have lost this somatic-marker function and hence have difficulties making simple decisions, not to mention complex ones. For the author, “somatic markers are the rails that stabilize *acquired dispositions* [habitus].” Somatic markers are “conditioned into us through experience” and serve as ground for reason. This makes reason a “set of socially acquired dispositions.” Hence, “the social habitus conditions all human behavior, not just irrational ‘body automatisms’” (p. 162). In sum, as we, social actors, feel social pressures to behave in certain ways, we experience and internalize the icotic and ecotic norms of the group to which we belong. These norms become our habit through habitus which is preserved and stabilized via somatic markers.

Habitus or the “social pressures” that make social actors adopt collective normative habits can be further explained by the social neurology of empathy, a new subfield of neurology. It shows that body states are contagious when they are displayed as body language. We mirror our interlocutors’ body states via our mirror neuron system whose reactions and responses are too rapid and too fluent “to be deliberate, consciously planned and executed” (p.163). It is thus an automatic and somatic system which makes us *feel* in our bodies our group members’ approval and disapproval of our behaviors. As this kind of sharing of feeling or affection is circulated and networked, collective social habits are stabilized via somatic markers and become normative within a group.

The transmission of habitus happens in individuals from infancy. As infants “learn” from their caretakers through the mirroring of body language, they are “downloading” the icotic habitus—a regulatory system of guidance—which the caretakers pick up from the cultural fields in which they live and work.

The mirror neuron system and somatic-marker hypothesis help to explain, or they are very close to, Mengzi's social ecologies of feeling—empathy. For the author, empathy is to transfeel with each other, to *feel* as the others feel in the others' position(s). To argue for this point of view, the author considers Mengzi's 仁 *ren* through Laozi's 無心 *wuxin* ("no heart") in the sentence 聖人恆無心, 以百姓心爲心 *shengren heng wuxin, yi baixing xin wei xin* ("Sage constant(ly) lacks heart/feeling, takes hundred surnames' heart as heart"). As the sage takes people's hearts as heart, what the sage lacks is actually a "separate stable heart"—a heart with a boundary separating him/her from the common people (百姓 *baixing*; "the hundred surnames"). In other words, the sage does have a heart—a collective heart that he/she shares with the people and that is "always in process, always serving as a conduit for the collective feeling that keeps flowing through it" (p. 41). The author thus takes Mengzi's 心 *xin* ("heart")—the locus of *ren*—as Laozi's 無心 *wuxin* "nonindividual heart" and identifies them as 心爲心 *xin wei xin* "heart as heart". He also translates expansively the term 心 *xin* here as "heart-becoming-mind or as feeling-becoming-thinking" (p. 46). "Feeling-becoming-thinking" is an insight from Kwong-loi Shun's discussion on Mengzi's 心之官則思 *xin zhi guan ze si* ("the heart's office/function is to think") in which 思 *si* is the thinking directed by affect.¹ The author goes on to claim that "[the] affective directing/guiding/managing/commanding of thought/attention/perception/focus in effect *saturates* cognitive/conscious apperception of the world with managerial or 'officious' affect" (p. 47). This claim is not surprising if we bear in mind Damasio's somatic-marker hypothesis that cognition and reason are guided by affect and conation. Transfeeling or "[taking] heart as heart" is an empathetic projection, circulated through a group and enhanced by reticulation of the projection. That it is operated through somatic markers makes it possible for us even to transfeel the feeling of those who are absent. Social ecologies as icosis and ecosis—group norms of truth/reality and of goodness—are stabilized and formed as habit by such ability of transfeeling.

Now we come to a significant innovation: the provisional 道=心 *Dao=heart* equation (p. 41). The author adopts Ames and Hall's ideas of *Dao* as "way-making" and as field of experience. He argues that the *Dao* is our way-making guided by a habitualized social propensity—as if there is a force behind—and hence refers to the *Dao* as "some unknown force that is probably shaped by habit" (p.56). The sense of the *Dao* as field of experience heavily relies on social ecologies which are shaped by the reticulation of transfeeling. As 仁 *ren* is considered "an interactive phenomenology of shared feeling, a socioaffective ecology" (p. 73), a 仁人 *ren ren* would be a person "who participates tranceptively in socioaffective ecologies, both receiving and retransmitting other people's feelings" (p. 74). The author considers that Mengzi's 心 *xin* is "the soil in which what he calls the 四端 *si duan* 'four shoots' are rooted (根 *gen*, 7A21)". The four shoots are social ecologies in and through which social value

¹ Kwong-loi Shun, *Mencius and Early Chinese Thought* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

circulates and which encourage the participation of individuals in the group norms. Mengzi's 心 *xin* hence is that which provides for social ecologies. The Dao=heart equation in this context could be understood as our way-making and its consequent field of experience being equal to feeling-becoming-thinking in the sense that the Dao is made in and through the heart.

We may sum up the section regarding the demystified Dao as follows. First, since habit is an unknown/preconscious force just as the Dao is traditionally defined, the author, in following Ames and Hall, identifies the Dao as habit. Second, habit is formed by habitus, which is an embodied system of dispositions, involving gradual inculcation of icosis and ecosis—group norms of truth/reality and goodness that are formed and transmitted intergenerationally. Third, the embodiment of habitus can be explained by the somatic-marker hypothesis, which holds that our feelings and emotions mark experience without the involvement of consciousness and that bodily markers play an important role in our reasoning process. Fourth, as feelings and emotions are contagious, typically through our mirror neuron system, we have a natural ability to transfeel or to be empathetic to others. The interpersonal projection and reflection of feelings power icosis and ecosis, which pressure individuals to think and behave according to group norms.

II. *Wuwei* translation

The entire theme of this book starts with the author's debate with Ritva Hartama-Heinonen, a Finnish translation scholar. Since Hartama-Heinonen and Dinda L. Gorrée, her licentiate thesis supervisor from 2001 to 2005, promote abductive translation as submitting to the unknown force of signs or text, the author qualifies their approach as Daoist: the force that translators should submit to is something like unknown Dao and the consequent abductive translation is 無爲 *wuwei* ("not acting") translation, or effortless translation.

However, while equally suggesting a Daoist-style translation, the author holds a very different view on what this entails. As the author follows Ames and Hall's position and demystifies the Dao into social ecologies shaped by habits through habitus, he also understands the concept of *wuwei* along this line: *wuwei* is "not about not acting; it's about habitualized acting" (p.26). As our feeling, doing, knowing and so on are so habitualized that we are not aware of the fact that we are feeling, doing and knowing things, it feels as if there is not an active "I" that is working but a force running through us. *Wuwei* translation, or "d(a)ing translation" as the author phrases it, would then mean that a translator surrenders unconditionally to "the functioning of her or his own professional habits" (p. 27), and is able to translate spontaneously, or on autopilot mode.

Three differences between the author and Hartama-Heinonen are worth pointing out. First, though both claim to be followers of Peirce, the author maintains and further develops Peirce's triadic theoretical model, while Hartama-Heinonen only seems

to care about the First among the triad, i.e. abduction. Second, Hartama-Heinonen believes that the author's approach in his previous work confines the creativity of translators by the drudgery of *acting* such as learning a foreign language and consulting dictionaries. Third, for the author, *wuwei* is effortless action while Hartama-Heinonen is in favor of its sense of not-acting. Let's start with Peirce's triadic model which tracks everything in three-step sequences:

1. First: abstract potential; ideal before it is tested in practical reality; the act of making an intuitive leap from unexplained data to a hypothesis (p.14)
2. Second: challenges from reality (p.14)
3. Third: mediating between abstract ideal and reality (p.14)

The author matches this model with Goriée's (1994) instinct-experience-habit triad and the abduction-induction-deduction from his own earlier work, and he applies this to translation as follows (1997/2012:63; 2015:16-17):

1. Instinct (G)/ First (P)
Blind, intuitive, instinctive sense of what a word or phrase means, how a syntactic structure works
2. Experience (G)/ Second (P)
Translating, moving back and forth between the source and target languages
 - (1) Abduction (R; the author)
 - a first approach to the foreign language and the source text
 - not knowing how to proceed, being confused (etc.), but somehow making the leap
 - involves creativity, intuition, leaps
 - (2) Induction (R)
 - the translator tests the abductive solution inductively in a variety of contexts
 - experience of world, source language, target language and resource people
 - (3) Deduction (R)
 - experience of translation: theorizing, translation precepts, linguistics, text analysis, cultural analysis, reference works
3. Habit (G)/ Third (P)

Sublimating specific solutions to specific experiential problems into more or less unconscious behavior patterns (habit) in order to help the translator to translate faster

In the author's model, even though abduction—hypothesis—is an instinctive guess, that “instinct” actually derives from habit which relies on one's accumulated experience and is formed by habitus through icosis and ecosis. The more experience one has accumulated and the deeper the translator has been saturated in both the source and the target cultures, the better guess/intuition he/she would have for new encounters.

This is the point that distinguishes the author and Peirce from Hartama-Heinonen as the latter takes abduction, as well as the intuition involved, as coming from some mysterious force of signs and as something detached from experience. She is even surprised at the emphasis that translation theories put on Secondness—the translator's interaction and encounter with the text as reality—and on the active side of translation,

the *act* of translation. Hence, abductive translation means for her a passive and submissive surrender to the sign or text, involving *no* effort of action.

Wuwei translation, translating without effort, would be like driving on autopilot mode. In Hartama-Heinonen's model of abductive translation, the function of the autopilot comes from the mystical force of the sign, and the translator only needs to sit aside and let the sign or text drive/translate by itself. The d(a)joining translation of the author, however, suggests that the force of the autopilot comes from the translator's habit, which is formed by the translator's ample experience in dealing with the transfer patterns between the source and the target languages and by the source and the target cultures' habitualization of their languages. From time to time, the translator may feel slight turbulences in the process of translation, such as problems and difficulties when encountering unfamiliar words or incomprehensible syntaxes. In these moments, the translator would need to "shift out of 'autopilot' and into 'manual', into full conscious analytical awareness" (Robinson 1997; 2012:200). Yet, as experience is gained, the solutions to these turbulences will eventually be incorporated into the autopilot program. In Peirce's sense, it means that habit encounters and then encompasses surprise.

The autopilot metaphor reminds me of the Cook Ding passage in the *Zhuangzi*,² the passage that Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi sees as a prime example of flow experience.³ Cook Ding has reached the stage of cutting up oxen without attentively focusing on the details of the ox's body structure. He moves the knife spontaneously along the paths within the ox as if his senses had no need to function. Only when he reaches a complicated spot does he *see* the difficulty and deal with it cautiously until it is resolved. Even though Cook Ding's cutting seems to be driven by an unknown force, the spontaneity of his activity actually results from his familiarity with the movements of cutting and of the ox's structure. In terms of the author's autopilot metaphor and Peirce's triad, Cook Ding cuts up the ox on autopilot mode. When interacting with reality—the ox or the world—complicated spots or turbulences constitute surprises that call on Cook Ding's/the translator's attention and full consciousness. After adjusting his movements and updating his skill, the cook/translator will overcome the difficulties and the new experience will be incorporated into the "program" of cutting/translating for future reference. This passage may contribute to the author's argument of "d(a)-oing translation" in a twofold way. First, the claim from Cook Ding himself that he is interested in the Dao rather than in skill qualifies him as a figure who promotes the Dao. Second, Cook Ding's numinous skill has been a focus of attention in recent scholarship, especially in relation to the topic of embodiment and to the debate on

² For the primary text, see Din Cheuk Lau and Fong Ching Chen, eds., *A Concordance to the Zhuangzi* 莊子逐字索引 (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 2000), 3/7/30-3/8/11.

³ See Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Isabella Selega Csikszentmihalyi, eds., *Optimal Experience: Psychological Studies of Flow in Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 380-382.

whether effortless action can be achieved through effort, an issue that is called the “paradox of wu-wei” by Edward Slingerland⁴. If the author were to interpret this passage, he would probably see Cook Ding as one who has attained the level of cutting up oxen spontaneously, effortlessly, on autopilot *after* having habitualized a set of movements of cutting up oxen, i.e. *after* having accumulated abundant embodied experience of effortful cutting. Moreover, even Cook Ding’s mastery of cutting still involves Secondness, the encounter of reality, in that the difficult spots in the oxen still require his conscious and careful engagement.

One might challenge the suggestion of drawing the Cook Ding passage into the discussion of this book by pointing out that expertise at cutting oxen is highly dependent on personal practice and feeling that is hard to transmit to others. However, if taking this passage as a model that stands for other fields of experience, such as morality or life-cultivation, one must have learned, nevertheless, how to engage through certain norms of those fields, whether verbal or preverbal, when one embarks on them. These norms have been established and modified by, and have been evolving through, previous generations before being transmitted to the present. This sense of ecology, icosis and ecosis in particular, is a contribution of this book to the wu-wei paradox, or to the debate on whether morality-cultivation is moral or not. It is also this sense of ecology that signifies the contribution of, in the author’s words, Mengzi’s version of *wuwei*—勿助長 *wu zhu zhang* “not to help [the plants] to grow”—to the topic at issue. As the plants know best how to grow, the best way to help them is to guarantee their environmental conditions but *not to intervene* in their growth and development. As the author notes, the environmental conditions, the ecology, have never been isolated from the plants by Mengzi. Rather, Mengzi considers “human ethical growth ...as the whole ecology” (p. 51).

It is exactly because of this ecological sense that the Mengzi passages add positive value to our conception of *wuwei* in applying it to translation theory. If we only consider and discuss the translator’s translating, the actor and the action of translation, Laozi’s *wuwei* is probably sufficient to the debate in the sense which the author previously worked out: “爲無爲，則無不治 *wei wuwei, ze wu bu zhi*” as “let go of control and the solution will magically emerge” (Robinson 1997; 2012). This sense of *wuwei* can be modeled as follows.

	The one who lets go of control/acting effortlessly	The work
Laozi	I or Ruler	Myriad things’ achievements
Mengzi	Gardener	Plants’ growth

⁴ Edward Slingerland, *Effortless Action: Wu-Wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Conceptual Ideal in Early China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 5.

Translation scholars	Translator	Translation
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With Mengzi’s ecological concern, we need to add another column that signifies the supportive conditions.

	The one who lets go of control/acting effortlessly	The work	Supportive conditions
Laozi	I or Ruler	Myriad things’ achievements	
Mengzi	Gardener	Plants’ growth	Ecological system
Translation scholars	Translator	Translation	?

In Mengzi’s plant case, the supportive conditions would be *environmental* ones such as water, soil, sun and so on; they are necessary for the growth of plants. According to the author’s theoretical framework, I suspect the condition that is necessary for translation could be summed up as the *training* of the translator: learning well the source and the target languages, becoming familiar with the source and the target cultures, learning and acquiring mastery of the transfer patterns between two languages, and so on. Perhaps it is *the process*, or *the whole project, of training*, that the author intends to focus on in this book. As such, effortless translation simply represents the final stage or achievement of training and it is not sufficient to explain the entire process of a translator from novice to master. Perhaps the crucial difference between the author and Hartama-Heinonen is that the latter seems to ignore, or downplay, the cultivation necessary to become a translator, while the former seriously looks into the process of training.

It is also this sense of process that indicates the author’s degree of relying on Ames and Hall, who are in turn influenced by Whitehead’s process philosophy. The author agrees with Ames and Hall’s translation of 誠 *cheng* in the 中庸 *Zhongyong* as “creativity” (pp. 107-109; Ames and Hall 2001). Based on their “understanding of reality as creative and of creativity as the animating drive powering everything that exists” (p. 109), the author argues against Hartama-Heinonen’s concern with the translator’s creativity. In Hartama-Heinonen’s view, only passive abduction that consists of pure instincts—the instincts that never engage with habit or experience—leaves room for creativity. She also holds that the author’s emphasis on habit, or on habitualizing anti-creative routines, would confine the creativity of the translator. Having interpreted Hartama-Heinonen’s “creativity” as freedom—“freedom from conscious effort” (p. 106), the author argues that such freedom actually results from the translator’s training. He further declares: “[the] translator is most ‘excellent’ (德 *de*)

and most ‘creative’ (誠 *cheng*) when she or he has internalized/habitualized the field’s or marketplace’s communal norms, values, and attitudes as a creative completion of self” (p.111). In so far reality is a process and therefore creative, nothing in the world will be uncreative.

III. Final remarks

In this review, I have taken the liberty of reconstructing the logical flow of this book so as to make it more accessible to myself. The author’s theoretical construction regarding the demystified Dao—Dao as habit—is not difficult to follow if one takes Ames and Hall’s approach. In the same line, the author rather successfully enriches the theoretical background of the demystified Dao by combining specific modern Western theories. One should be cautious, though, in taking the understanding of Dao as habit as the most plausible interpretation of the Dao in the *Laozi*. After all, Ames and Hall have been influenced by Whitehead, whose philosophy draws on American pragmatism, which has in turn been influenced by Transcendentalism (p. 110). Even though ancient Chinese ideas play an important role in the philosophy of Transcendentalism, as the author reconstructs in §3.7, it is hard to say whether Transcendentalism comprehended these ideas in exactly the same way as Chinese intellectuals did in ancient times. Would Laozi, as well as Laozians, really agree that Dao is habit as constructed by, and evolved with, social norms? Can this understanding coherently interpret *Laozi* passages? How does this view compare, for example, with the forty-eighth chapter of the *Laozi*, which says “爲學日益，爲道日損 *wei xue ri yi, wei dao ri sun*” which Ames and Hall translate as “[in] studying, there is a daily increase, while in learning of way-making (*dao*), there is a daily decrease”?⁵ Should we also interpret these two lines as different stages of one’s profession, as indicating a “before” and an “after”? If so, training as the “before” is apparently not part of Dao, the “after.” In other words, way-making does not include learning/training; it is done through *decrease* rather than through *increase*. Such are the questions the author might need to solve in referring to the *Laozi* in relation to a theory of translation which takes training into consideration.

In this regard, the *Zhuangzi*, another of the classic Daoist works, might offer more sources as it contains a number of what A. C. Graham groups as “knack stories,” stories of people who master specific skills to the level of spontaneity, including the Cook Ding story discussed above.⁶ Knack stories in the *Zhuangzi* have attracted considerable attention in modern *Zhuangzi* scholarship, with a particular emphasis on the topic of embodiment. If the author would like to consider including a discussion

⁵ Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, *Dao De Jing: Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), p. 151.

⁶ For further discussion, see A. C. Graham, *Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters* (Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001), reprinted, the chapter entitled “Spontaneity” pp. 6-8.

of the *Zhuangzi* knock stories, his theory of d(a)oing translation might be enriched not only because of the text but also because of the related scholarship, and the result might in turn contribute to the field of Daoist research.

《文化貿易：清代至民國時期四堡的書籍交易》，包筠雅 (Cynthia J. Brokaw) 著，劉永華、饒佳榮等譯，北京：北京大學出版社，二〇一五年，512 頁。

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包筠雅 (Cynthia J. Brokaw) 的《文化貿易：清代至民國時期四堡的書籍交易》(*Commerce in Culture: The Sibao Book Trade in the Qing and Republican Periods*) 一書，英文本出版於二〇〇七年，於二〇一五年簡體中譯版問世⁷。本書在當時甫出版即受各界的好評，中西論者皆給予極高的評價，全書近六百頁的內容，幾可視為對中國書籍社會史研究的典範，體現了西方學界對中國書籍社會史研究的熱潮；在等待中譯的這段時間裏，似乎亦尚未有能與之媲美，兼及廣度與深度的研究成果。經過十年之後，當中文譯本於華文世界問世的今日，時間所提供的縱深，正足以令人們重新審視並進而思索華文學界在書籍史研究的成績與未來。

不可諱言，當前對於書籍出版史的研究，似乎不似十年之前那樣掀起熱潮，與其用研究議題的流行週期去理解，未免過於籠統簡化，倒不如視其為一種刺激學界之後爆發形成的穩定期，進而成為學術常態思考的一部分。書物流通所顯現的社會或思想意涵，已成為學界的共識，並精緻分解成各項專業的議題，成為研究者直接鑽研或間接受其影響的學術資源。《文化貿易》作為中國書籍出版史開拓時期的代表著作，其不凡之處，在於掌握單一課題的深入研究，又能回應對中國社會史研究的整體關懷，展開更宏觀的視野，凸顯以書籍出版作為歷史進路的意義，皆讓此書成為難以跨越的里程碑。也因此，本書的中譯或將勾起更多中文讀者對此議題的興趣和思索，從中汲取資源和啟發，帶動下一波的研究成果。

如書名所示，本書的研究對象是清代至民國時期福建四堡一地的圖書出版事業，然通觀全書，本書幾乎涉及了社會史或文化史所關心的諸多側面：地方史、家族史、商業史、大眾消費與文化、知識的傳遞和流布、基層社會等等。以四堡書業為起點，開展出對中國——特別是邊緣和下層——社會的具體圖像。雖談的

⁷ 包筠雅 (Cynthia J. Brokaw) 著，劉永華、饒佳榮等譯：《文化貿易：清代至民國時期四堡的書籍交易》（北京：北京大學出版社，2015 年）。

是書籍，卻不只限於書籍本身，擴至書籍背後所觸及的社會層面，正是本書最具洞見之處，也是和傳統出版、書籍既有研究不同的地方。如作者在書中所描述，今日貧窮的四堡，在清代曾因坊刻出版事業而繁榮一時，特別是霧閣和馬屋兩地，是清代出版的重要據點，卻未得到後來研究者應有的重視。原因除了四堡地處偏鄉，亦和坊刻業以營利為目的的性質有關，於是造成對於帝國晚期鄉村底層圖書出版銷售的忽視，只能對中國書籍出版史僅有片面的理解。作者跳脫這層盲點，挖掘出各式新的史料，進一步提供新的歷史解釋，不單能回答坊刻出版在明清兩代的延續與變化，也試圖回答不同文本在不同區域的流通和影響，勾勒出一般底層人民在閱讀和知識上的需要，填補過往知識地圖上的空白。

在第一章的導論中，作者概述了清代坊刻業的樣貌，看似單純承繼了晚明出版業的繁盛與延續，但在擴張的表象下，仍有自身內部性質上的轉變。明代的書業呈集中模式，以江南的南京、杭州和蘇州，以及閩北建陽縣這兩個集團為出版業的基地，即便是首都北京也難以與之匹敵，更遑論其他城市。集中在數個出版重鎮的模式，於明清易代之際的戰火中，遭受無情的破壞，這些舊有的出版重鎮有些從此一蹶不振，有些即使恢復運作，亦無法再如同過去那樣獨占市場。清帝國的出版業以另一種方式延續晚明的繁榮，在原本大型出版中心之外，產生出新中型中心，朝向省會城市和區域都會擴散，甚至再向下推及如四堡這種窮鄉僻壤的邊緣，再藉由四通八達的貿易網絡將這些中小型中心連結起來，至十九世紀後期，中國本土的大小區域，都依各自的規模和等級，被納入這書籍刊印、銷售的網絡之中。導致書業分散發展的原因很多，技術因素是關鍵之一，例如木刻技術簡易，以及易於攜帶、調配印量的特性，使它能有效降低成本和入門門檻，促成出版事業擴散和流動。此外，清代盛世的穩定，人口持續的增長，新拓殖地區的移民開發，皆帶動了市場對圖書的需求，以及印刷出版事業的轉移。種種因素交互作用下，這些新興的出版、銷售基地，與其所屬區域內外彼此間複雜連繫和競爭，構成了清代書籍貿易的特點。

全書的內容分為上下兩部，對四堡地區的書籍交易活動進行討論：上部〈四堡的圖書出版業和銷售業〉，主要介紹四堡圖書出版事業體，包括印刷到銷售上、中、下游的每一個組織和結構環節。下部〈四堡印刷書〉則是針對四堡所出版、販售的書籍，討論它們在清代和民初社會中的地位 and 影響力。前者的對象是四堡的事業體，後者則為四堡所出版的產品，無論何者，皆緊扣著與社會發展、變革間的互動關係。

第一部分的首章以地理環境為起點，從自然和人文地理的角度，提供了解閩西和四堡書業發展的背景。除了令讀者了解四堡出版業興起的時空環境及其演變，諸如貧瘠的客家移民社會、支持程朱理學的科考導向等等，點出這些先天條件形塑下當地書業的獨特性格。其中最關鍵的，莫過四堡圖書出版位於「邊緣中的邊緣」的位置，在這貧窮的客家移民群落裏，以宗族活動為主體，居民嘗試各種多樣化的職業以維持生計，促成了家庭生產和行商網絡的結合，奠定了當地鄒氏、馬氏兩家族朝向商業發展的志向和基礎，日後四堡書業的經營亦不脫該模式。

第三章則論及四堡出版業的起源和書籍生產流程。當地關於書業起源的說法眾說紛紜，但各種不同的傳說，皆指出四堡的出版種子應是經由行商由外地帶回，並在配合當地教育事業的增長，獲得商業利益之後，再逐漸由地方擴及至整個區域，而形成產業。在資本化生產的過程，將當地的自然資源利用到極限，以獲取印刷原料，有時亦用低價向周邊地區採購；人力成本上則以集權式的家族企業，動員族人和族內女性，務求降低人力開銷。這種以壓縮成本和快速生產為特色，大量印製廉價又符合市場需求的文本，使資本有限的四堡書商能在全國的市場中取得一席之地。在第四章討論四堡出版業結構時，指出家族的控制力量所扮演的主導角色，當地作坊多為家庭作坊形態，以核心／主幹／聯合家庭等不同的形式經營和連結，通過集權的家長管理模式，進行動員、降低成本、獲利亦必須再回饋家庭，形成一種再投資的正向增長。這些利潤或大或小，巨者造就了當地的富商，差者足可貼補一家之用，其榮景直到二十世紀二、三〇年代，在商業環境改變和政府榨取政策作用下才告一段落。除了持續投資書業，購置良田宅第外，亦投入家族內的教育事業，與族內或鄉里的建設，也因為當地書業經營是以家庭為基本，使得這些回饋直接或間接地增加出版事業的資源。

此種以家庭或家族為單位的經營、增長模式，亦有其發展的限制，一旦擴張至極限或出現內部失和的情況，造成第五章所討論的「分家」情況時，對書業的長期經營影響甚鉅。家庭作坊的運作規模，約莫以七、八十口人為上限，書業一旦成長至臨界點，家族成員之間的競爭、失和就會日趨嚴重，分家成為常見的結局和手段。然而，不同於農業的經營邏輯，分家對於族商模式的四堡而言，正面獲益是否多於負面效應，端看經營者的分配和協調。個別書坊的獨大雖被抑制，卻也造就新書坊的增加，從而促成了經營據點和網路的擴大。此外，家族約束力仍發揮一定的作用，以通過情感的道德勸說、利益的公平分配，以及約定俗成的

商業慣例，減緩了分家之後同宗書坊間可能產生的惡性競爭。

第六、七章則在處理書坊於經銷和店面營運的技術環節，由實務層面進行描寫。對以行商起家，並藉由跨區域交易獲利的四堡書商而言，不論從原料取得或產品銷售的角度來看，交易網絡如同重要的命脈。清代在交通運輸上的拓展，明清之際客家的移民與遷徙模式，以及清代人口和經濟的擴張，構築成龐大廣闊的商業市場絡網，給予四堡商人在商業上開疆拓土、持續增長的利基。四堡商人尤其傾向在各區域政經中心之外的次級行政或商業中心行銷，以避開大城市激烈的競爭，顯示了他們在資源有限的情况下，謀求最大利益的一貫邊緣性格。在店面的營運上，分別為流動和分店經營兩種不同模式，這兩種模式之間有時具有發展上的先後順序，即在流動過程中發現合適的市場，轉而定居成為分店的經營者。無論何者，資金和貨物經營的確保都是首要之務，並且在這樣的流動過程中，一方面和其他經營者建立起複雜的競合關係，另一方面也試圖融入當地社會中，書籍販賣場所往往成為當地的文化重鎮。

作為第一部分的總結，第八章強調即便有上述以市場為導向的經營方式，以及不斷壓低成本，獲取最大利潤的商人性格，四堡商人在自我認同上，仍以「儒商」自居。在建構自我形象時突出自身儒者的色彩，是明清以來的商人傳統，呼應著傳統士農工商的價值排序，四堡商人又因為所經營者為圖書出版的文化事業，必須強化和知識菁英之間的關聯與互動，透過各式各樣的建構，賦予自己近似知識菁英的模貌，淡化商人的身分，以利於打入士人階層中，爭取更多的顧客。此外，一切以家族為依歸是四堡出版業由始至終最重要的特性，使他們能另闢蹊徑，獨立於受制中人、捐客所控制的商業網路，藉由壓低成本而自成一天地，建立不亞於競爭對手的長途商業網絡。然而，成也家族，敗也家族，在面對民初時代的轉變時，家族式經營缺乏調整彈性和靈活度，不僅限制了發展的空間，也被時代所自然淘汰。

本書第二部分旨在分析四堡出版物的內容，並勾勒出這些書籍在清代文化中所造成的影響。四堡以暢銷為宗旨的經營策略，使他們對出版物必須作出謹慎而正確的判斷，以期書籍獲得市場最大的重視和回響，在清代社會的文化圖像中，取得安身的商業位置。這些刻本的獲得，仰賴著具一定知識水準的家庭成員從事編輯，亦藉由廣大的貿易網絡，向外地尋找編輯者。但無論何者，皆以各地的市場需求為核心宗旨。作者將四堡出版品分為三類，第十章討論最大宗者——教育類書籍，這是四堡書業的命脈。四堡出版業的成立和沒落，都和教育類書籍密不

可分。四堡出版品的選擇也都依據科舉制度各階段所需，從蒙學雜字、幼學輔導教材、文範、詩選及詩賦指南，再至經書相關知識，以及其他經典的出版，對應了養成一位應試士子各階段的學習需要。此種出版選擇和十九世紀其他出版中心無異，但四堡書業一面嚴守市場的常規，又不斷非常規地更新書單。此外，特別重視實用性，不出版進階或個人著作，而是多為具體的教學指南。他們所設定的客群，多半為中下層受教育者和科考生員，鎖定教育金字塔的底層，也就是最大的教材市場，而非成本昂貴的高端市場。若由書籍所編纂的內容來看，四堡的教本也推翻了人們對傳統中國科舉教育僅重背誦、朗讀的刻板印象，在強記之外，如何讓讀者有效率地理解記誦內容，是內容編纂時仍未忽視的環節。

第十一章所討論的實用性書籍，如禮儀指南、醫藥指南和占卜指南等，四堡出版是教學和科考書籍之外的另一大宗。實用指南分類十分廣泛，包含禮儀書、醫書、風水書、善書等等，四堡出版商針對客群的不同，就不同類目出版難度、裝訂等級不一的品項，以利讀者選購，但主要仍以中下層讀者為主。購買者的目的，或出於自己的閱讀興趣，抑或是以此作為謀生工具，後者大半多為科考仕途不順、另謀出路的士人，經由這些實用所詳載的知識，謀求轉職、糊口的可能。這些書籍市場大，流傳廣泛，藉由這些將知識平易化的書籍，菁英的正統價值觀也在潛移默化中得到普遍的鞏固，此外也說明清代城市「中產階級」的崛起及其興趣，大量印製的廉價書籍也許無法給予精深高妙的抽象思辨，使其成為一代大儒，但能讓他們以最低的投資，獲得擁有文化的表象，知識也得到了普及的可能。

第十二章則在討論小說和純文學的印製。這類書籍對書坊而言，通常是在實用書籍印刷、出版累積到一定規模後，才有餘力印刊的書籍。在四堡書一貫重視低成本、高獲利的經營原則下，這些印刷成本較高、市場需求不敵科考的出版品，流傳較為有限，說明了他們不同於實用書籍的收藏和閱讀模式。在小說方面，四堡出版者以歷史小說為眾，一方面迎合明代以來的閱讀偏好，另一方這類將嚴肅歷史知識通俗化、娛樂化的書寫方式，相當程度上具有善書的實用意味，廣為讀者所接受與喜愛。俠義小說和公案小說則為另一出版大宗，特別是其中具歷史背景者，至二十世紀早期，這類讀物和才子佳人小說均成為四堡小說類別的主流。就售價方面，四堡同樣針對不同客群的喜好，對各類別的小說以不同的成本印刷，訂立各自的售價，大體上仍以能薄利多銷的小說為出版主軸。在戲劇和歌冊一類，四堡集中在後者的印製，它可以用來娛樂，也可以作為表演者演出或

訓練的底本，亦有高低不同的售價區隔。這些小說或歌冊，因價格低廉，內容有趣，廣受讀者歡迎。和科考書籍一樣，相同內容能於不同地區販售，成為凝聚各個區域和族群間的媒介。四堡出版業雖有詩集或文人小說的出版，整體上仍佔少數，但亦顯示他們希望能顧及高端讀者，開拓不同市場的努力。不管是小說、戲冊、歌冊或藝術書籍，其一貫目的仍是吸引最多的讀者，因此選書和印刷品質都走低廉、易讀的路線。這些平價的刻本，有時也會超越文字和口語之間的界限，成為口述說書時的底本，傳播給更底層的文盲受眾。

第十三章分析四堡圖書主要的客群和大眾文本文化 (popular textual culture)：四堡書籍售價相對低廉，然而仍決定於消費者自身的收入條件。綜合各種對清代收入的研究，四堡的平價至少能符合部分讀者的需要，雖然讀者可能得忍受印刷和裝訂品質的粗糙。在大眾文本文化方面，這些出版品中的保有儒家的經典思想，是傳統的載體，發揮著教化的效果，並穿越了雅俗之間的文化隔閡，亦藉由口語的再傳授，進入底層社會。也正因四堡的書籍符合不同階層的社會的需要，即使外在現實環境發生諸多的改變，只要文化根底未被動搖，它們可以持續維持長期而穩定的銷量，從十七世紀後期到二十世紀早期，傳播或回應著一種穩定而保守的大眾文化。在第十四章中，作者總結出四堡印刷業的發展是一不斷擴散的過程，不單是地域上的擴張，也在社會、文化的各個層面，皆觸及了不同意義下的邊陲。比較潞灣鎮、岳池縣和馬崗等其他類似的出版基地，四堡的運作模式既有相似之處，亦有自身的獨特特徵，顯示了清代坊刻在出版和銷售的多樣性，造成了書籍的流通和文化的散布，形成某種共同的書籍文化。這樣的書籍文化是具有彈性而非排他的，在傳布經典的同時，亦會不時加入區域的特色，符合當地讀者的需要。書籍的增加，不能直接等同於識字能力的增加，但說明了針對某些特定領域，以實用為目的基本識字能力的增長。在政治的影響上，四堡圖書的內容或維護了菁英價值觀，卻也在不知不覺中支持了清代新興起的「中產階級」；再加上傳布空間的擴大，造成了不同元素的進入，而不同書籍在不同讀者之間所發揮的影響，有時也跳脫了菁英正統的控制。

綜觀全書，如多數評論者提及的，最搶眼的部分或許是在史料的搜集和應用上。為完成對四堡出版業的討論，作者挖掘出各式各樣的資料，除使用四堡各出版家族內部的資料，大量搜集四堡出版品外，還應用了諸如族譜、方志等資料，並實地考察，對相關人士的後裔進行口述訪談，以多元的資料來源為條件，終能將塵封多年，不為人重視的龐大四堡書業呈現在世人面前。相較於史料的搜集，

本書更令人激賞的是在史料的應用。第二部分的出版品的使用是最明顯的例子，讓眾多的書目成爲清代大眾閱讀或書籍文化的進入，分析的是書籍、書目，呈現出來的則是讀者生活的面貌。除此之外，這些四堡出版資料中，留有大量的空隙和斷點，各章篇幅的不一，正顯示了資料多寡的差異。如此多的空白只能藉由作者的想像力加以填補，這或許才是本書最高明之處。這也說明相關後繼研究所面臨的難題，在搜集和應用資料方面的限制，無疑是最大考驗。如果能持續以歷史人類學式的考察努力，找到類似四堡這樣完成的資料，或是有效地發揮或重新解讀既有的資料，將是能有新突破的關鍵。

其次，本書在問題意識上呈現出一種跨界、統合的運用，如前述書籍史只是表面的進路，背裏扣合了無數重要的社會史或文化史的議題，將舊有史學次學門的不同關懷，加以整合出整體的歷史圖像。書中各章所觸及的各項議題，都論及社會史或文化史研究的專業，經由四堡出版業的個案將這些看似獨立的研究對象串連，構成清代社會中下層社會的歷史圖像。書籍出版的營運則是社會運作的一端，書籍出版的成果是整體文化的顯現，能兼及兩者，並在其中取得平衡，使得本書不僅是單一個案的研究，也回應著更爲整體、深刻的關懷。四堡書業無論在生產和經銷過程中的邊緣特質，以及廉價坊刻本面向平民大眾，及重視獲利，在經由作者爬梳之後，成爲觀察帝國邊緣如何納入文化網絡的管道，同時也得以摸索出上層菁英知識如何普及於下層，並受其回饋的動向。也唯有這樣宏觀的研究視野和問題意識，才能發揮書籍出版研究的真正意義，而非僅是在史學研究的範疇下，另添一新穎的分類而已。因爲這一波書籍出版史的影響，今日當人們談論許多和書籍出版不直接關聯的議題時，仍會大量採用書籍史的觀念，知識的流通和傳布不再是毋須探討的必然，中間的層層轉譯，上下階層的互動，以及社會整體的流動和樣貌，都須研究者重新關注和說明的議題。或可斷言，在此波書籍出版史成果後，也許尚未有可供比擬的專著出現，但已爲史學研究提供了不容忽視和迴避的研究方法和視角。如同明清之間書業的變化，或許書籍出版史的研究也經歷了從中心向四方擴散的過程，唯有在與更多不同領域碰撞，集結更多元的回饋和提問，如此將產生令人期待的下一波成果。

總之，充足的「資料」和精闢的「問題意識」本來即是最令研究者困擾的兩者，同時也是決定研究好壞的關鍵。兩者互爲因果、彼此影響，此外並無其他捷徑或答案。尤其對於書籍出版史這類新興、成長中的議題而言，尋覓、開發新的史料來源，一直是十分艱巨的挑戰。因此運用新的「方法」，也許能提供出新的

解決門徑，例如近年於文史學界炙手可熱的「數位人文」研究方法，或是可以多加考慮和應用的手段：藉由網路打破空間阻隔的便利，以及資料庫在查找上的快速，在資料的搜集上提供了極大的優勢，各種視覺化的呈現技巧，更切合於重視「字紙之上」的書籍出版史研究。唯一美中不足的，就是現階段數位人文的資料庫，在建置上仍過度偏重於全文，在觀念上仍是十分傳統式的內容導向，忽視了承載內容的媒介，以致未加留心於書籍外緣如裝幀、排版、出版項等資料的保存，這類偏圖像的處理，對資訊科技而言絕非難事，只是這幾年書籍史蓬勃發展的新觀念，未曾影響到資料庫建置的思維而言，對兩個新興的領域來說，都是十分可惜的。試想今日若有一資料庫，在保有書籍內容的同時，也能留有相關的圖像和線索，得以讓於各地進行田野的研究者，分享採集到的資訊，並能比對、勾勒出不同的關連和脈絡，筆者相信必能擴充書籍出版史的視野，激發出更多的問題與想像。畢竟書籍出版史的貢獻，是讓世人關注新媒介的生成及其所帶來的影響，那麼要加深或擴大書籍出版史的研究成果，應用新媒介的助力，可能最為適切——在挖掘知識的過程，即為知識本身的實踐。

