

全避免：諸如書中習見的感覺、美感或感應、情感，到底只是一般意義上的習慣用法，抑是具有心理學、文藝心理學意義上的用語？都可就佛經文字、詩話文字分別在本文或附註中說明，這是望之似易而實則不易的基本功。四則是體系建構：這部分黃氏頗為警覺，常在文中視情況而指明。既然不在〈緒論〉一開始就出現，以免套用之嫌、或讓讀者有先入為主之偏，在此建議可在〈結論〉中作一完整的綜合說明，到底「意境」在作者論、讀者論之間的關係為何？或是偏於作者的作品中心的創作，抑或讀者但據作品反映宇宙？這一文學論上的根本問題，其實也正是評價「意境」論的基本準據，應在總結時作一清楚的解說。五是比較理論：黃氏雖則自我定位為貫時性的歷史研究，但在解說如何用以理解歷代詩（自上古到唐代），卻仍不免涉及詩學理論上的比較。如何在不套用現代或西方理論的情況下，卻又可與現代人的知識經驗或語言思維作比較？這是未來建立中國文學批評術語及其體系，幾乎是不可避免之路。由本書之完成可以期許其有更深進一層的研究「境界」！從王夢鷗先生早年在《文學概論》中提出「境界」的討論，其後的文論探索也都是嘗試梳理中國人的詩學觀念，這是開創的階段；如今又有黃教授完成一個階段性的定鼎之作，如此就彰顯臺灣在文學批評界的「傳承」與「創新」中，其中所顯示的意義，自是譜系昭然，而又在成果上有「過於師」之處。若是王先生地下有知，恐怕也會有「方堪傳授」之識見吧！

Bringing the World Home: Appropriating the West in Late Qing and Early Republican China. By Theodore Hutters. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005. Pp. ix + 370.

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Though the preoccupation with defining modern China in relation to the West has been a thriving academic and historical practice, few contemporary scholars can provide a range of analysis as broad and masterful as Theodore Hutters in his new book, *Bringing the World Home: Appropriating the West in Late Qing and Early Republican China*. In many ways, this synthesis is long overdue. Given the wide attention given to the late Qing period in the past twenty years by literary scholars in Japan and China and, increasingly, United States, the fact that we are yet to have a coherent perspective on the rich complexity of this period testifies to its bewildering literary and cultural landscape. The important works of Tsurumoto Teruo 樽本照雄, Guo Yanli 郭延禮, Chen Pingyuan 陳平原, Patrick Hanan, and David Der-wei Wang 王德威 have set the

tone for rediscovering the genealogy of modernity in the nineteenth century.⁴ Widening the scope of this inquiry, Hutters offers to bridge some of the more central issues between intellectual and literary history from the 1860s through the first half of the Republican period.

Lest the reader is left with the easy impression that Hutters is attempting to give a fuller context to what we already know from existing scholarship, he is grappling anew with the core difficulty of understanding the various rationales from this period of uneasy transition. A useful overview of the difficult conceptual issues involved is lucidly given in the first chapter. Throughout the book, we are given meticulous analyses of how ideas came to be separated from the old according to “a countervailing tendency to shut off alternatives even as they were being advanced” (p. 7). Sorting through the array of new ideas that entered into intellectual discourse, Hutters demonstrates how the process of reception spun them down into nicely delineated “western,” as opposed to “Chinese,” concepts. In so doing, Hutters moves beyond the habitual defense of a Chinese modernity and probes, instead, the larger ground of its germination in a universal, rather than western, framework.

An important part of the story is told by revisiting the Yangwu Movement 洋務運動 and, in particular, the intensifying debates regarding the Chinese origin of western science and technology in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. As is well known, proponents and opponents to western learning fought bitterly over the necessity of absorbing foreign knowledge. The argument that such adaptation would not diminish China’s cultural superiority was reinforced with the rationale that modern scientific knowledge had already been anticipated, if not discussed, in ancient Chinese texts. While China strayed from the theoretical genius of its predecessors, the West had meanwhile taken these ideas and put them into practice. The epistemic clash between China and the West, therefore, became a matter of mediating one’s own lost cultural legacy. To take recourse in western learning was essentially a detour in retracing the trajectory China had always had within its grasp.

Though this kind of reasoning continued to resurface throughout the twentieth century and beyond, it was quickly castigated by reformers after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. China’s defeat prompted a sea of change, most notably in the intellectual

⁴ See, for example, Guo Yanli 郭延禮, *Zhongguo jindai fanyi wenxue gailun* 中國近代翻譯文學概論 (The Modern Translated Literature of China: An Introduction) (Hankou: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 1998), *Zhongxi wenhua pengzhuang yu jindai wenxue* 中西文化碰撞與近代文學 (Chinese and Western Cultural Interaction and Modern Literature) (Ji’nan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999); Chen Pingyuan 陳平原, *Chen Pingyuan xiaoshuoshi lunji* 陳平原小說史論集 (Collection of Chen Pingyuan on the History of Fiction), 3 vols. (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1997); Patrick Hanan, *Chinese Fiction of Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: Essays* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); David Der-wei Wang, *Fin-de-Siècle Splendor: Repressed Modernities of Late Qing Fiction, 1849-1911* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

orientation toward the supremacy of Chinese culture.⁵ While the Yangwu Movement still harbored certain illusions about civilizational superiority, the generation of reformers active around the turn of the century came to recognize something altogether different. What required learning was not merely technical and practical knowledge. China had to find a way to access the spiritual and philosophical worldview of the West that was the true secret of its success. As one of the most outspoken proponents of this new progressivism, Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854-1921) stood at the forefront of this change. The path he embarked on, however, led him to a series of questions that cannot be easily resolved. On this point, Hutters sheds important light on his earlier essays by underscoring the self-entrapment of Yan Fu's rhetoric. One example is the dichotomy between *gong* 公 and *si* 私. Despite their complementary rather than mutually exclusive connotations in Chinese intellectual thought, Yan redistributes them as polarities, "to remap onto separate cultural terrains the qualities that canonical neo-Confucian texts like the *Da xue* (The great learning) had always linked on a *continuum*" (p. 50; emphasis added). Though this was a comment on Yan Fu, it also aptly encapsulates Hutters' own critical angle. He consistently returns to the question why essentializing was a necessary and critical move for Yan Fu to depart from the Yangwu thinkers, and how that essentialism was culled from a spectrum of thought that did not always prioritize polarities and binaries as a category of moral intuition. Thus, in order for Yan to emphasize the non-Sinic origin of the West and the non-western origin of China, he had to set up dichotomies which later proved difficult for him to reconcile with the agenda of nation-saving, against which the West always appeared more advanced and superior.

There is, however, a different aspect of Yan's translations that makes this claim more difficult to accept. Yan Fu's approach toward western texts was unique in his emphasis on reviving unfamiliar Chinese terminology from ancient classical texts in explicating European political concepts. As Yan professed in a letter to Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873-1929), he spent three years pondering the Chinese equivalent of the concept of "right." Refusing to use the readily available Japanese neologisms (derived from classical Chinese) or the precedents set by western missionaries, Yan was not aiming at a clean break between China and the West. Choosing terms from texts that were notoriously obtuse even to his most learned contemporaries, Yan's Tongcheng 桐城 prose style was terse and difficult for a reason. He professed that this knowledge was not meant for the average layman. The understanding of western knowledge was reserved for the learned elite. He was not concerned, as Hu Shih 胡適 (1891-1962) and others soon would be, with wide accessibility and literacy. By taking recourse in an archaic vocabulary to translate recent western political and social thought, Yan in fact made an undeniable case for an elitist "Chinese origin," reified in the process of

⁵ For intellectuals' revisionist account of the failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement after 1895, see Benjamin Elman, "Naval Warfare and the Refraction of China's Self-Strengthening Reforms into Scientific and Technological Failure, 1865-1895," *Modern Asian Studies* 38.2 (May 2004): 283-326.

translation as a kind of self-discovery of Chinese thought. Against this heritage, neither China's current trend toward change nor the appeal of western humanistic thinking could measure up.

After laying out the intellectual context, Hutters directs our attention to the literary landscape and its emblematic figures of late Qing literature with a focus on Wu Jianren 吳研人 (1867-1910). Hutters underscores the important fact that the idea of *Xin xiaoshuo* 新小說 (New Fiction) did not begin with Liang Qichao. As Patrick Hanan already discussed in "The New Novel Before the New Novel—John Fryer's Fiction Contest," the English entrepreneur and editor of *Gezhi huibian* 格致彙編 (Science Compendium) announced a fiction contest on the "new trend in the novel" in the newspaper *Wanguo gongbao* 萬國公報 (Chinese Globe Magazine) in June 1895.⁶ Given the high profile of the publication, it is not surprising that late Qing writer and inventor Chen Diexian 陳蝶仙 (1879-1940) made a specific reference to it. Hutters emphasizes, however, that this aspiration for writing in a new style was not particular to the realm of fiction, as Fryer had already been advertising essay contests on science and contemporary affairs for almost thirty years in other leading Chinese newspapers. Liang Qichao's discussion of the importance of new novels just two years later clearly bears the imprint of Fryer's vision. Like many of his contemporaries, Liang was an avid reader of Fryer's voluminous translations of scientific treatises put out by the Jiangnan zhizaoju 江南製造局 (Jiangnan Arsenal). That he did not credit Fryer with this new view of fiction is itself a reminder of the truncated genealogy of the much prized "newness" around the turn of the century.

By reorienting our view of New Fiction in this extra-literary nexus of scientific translations and western cultural brokers, Hutters proceeds to analyze three major texts from this period, Wu Jianren's *Ershi nian mudu zhi guai xianzhuang* 二十年目睹之怪現狀 (Strange Events Eyewitnessed in the Past Twenty Years), *Xin Shitou ji* 新石頭記 (New Story of the Stone), and Zeng Pu's 曾樸 (1872-1935) *Niehai hua* 孽海花 (Flower in a Sea of Retribution). Though *New Story of the Stone* has been widely recognized as one of the earliest original works of "science fantasy" (to use David Wang's distinction) in China, its ranking with the other two novels, long held to be among the most important literary works of the late Qing, is itself suggestive of an attempted new look at what fiction meant. Perhaps because this would entail a much more in-depth view of not only well known but also second- and even third-rate fiction produced *en masse* during this period, Hutters does not take us there. Instead, he restricts himself to a closer look at the mutually defining moments of China and the West, as they were prominently thematized in these novels.

New Story of the Stone, in the regard, offers an insightful look into this configuration. Its appearance in 1905 coincides two important events: the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War and the Anti-American Goods Boycott. Both events reinforced the drive for nationalism. With their own defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 in recent historical memory, China received the news of Japan's victory with

⁶ See note 1.

ambivalence. The observed success of Japan, considered a fellow of the same “yellow” race, intensified China’s felt disadvantage in the modern world of nations. The boycott movement was a simultaneous gesture of defiance against this unpleasant recognition. Wu Jianren, who was heavily invested in the boycott, attended several public rallies and expressed his strong support in his correspondence with the leader Zeng Shaoqing 曾少卿 (1849-1908).⁷ In this light, his rewriting of eighteenth-century novel *Dream of the Red Chamber* (i.e., *Story of the Stone*), set in a futuristic world where China has appropriated and improved upon western technology, expresses the uneasy attempt to grapple with the meaning of westernization. As Hutters observes on p. 162,

The unprecedented nature of the position of the West vis-à-vis China, in other words, demands an unprecedented sort of critical reflection, a dialectal attitude that can facilitate the difficult feat of simultaneously holding in mind a sense of the threat of the West and the capacity to appropriate things from it that can be of use to China. In a sense, this intellectual position is embodied in late Qing China only by the complicated diversity of the city of Shanghai itself; the place represents a new sort of society, which *demand*s a new type of critical mentality to be able to make sense of what it means (my emphasis).

While Hutters then moves to focus on the significance of Shanghai’s urban variety in introducing this new society, his observation actually suggests an even more fruitful venue. The challenge to get into the mindset of the late Qing and to understand the epistemic makeup of its social and cultural universe is in fact the one feat that is recognized but yet to be undertaken in this field. This demands much more than just a reconstruction of a cultural world. In a way that *New Story of the Stone* was prompted by an inner and outer recognition of China’s need for national power, we also require an understanding of how late Qing society worked in conjunction with its own sense of universalism and the world. A comparative glance at *New Story of the Stone* with a slightly earlier science fiction, *Nüwa shi* 女媧石 (The Stone of Nüwa, 1904), for instance, might have given us a different vantage point for understanding the role of western technology in mediating perceptions of *wenhua* 文化 (culture) and *wenming* 文明 (civilization), terms much bandied about but little understood at the time. Given the wealth of science and futuristic fiction produced in the late Qing, *New Story of the Stone* may lay claim to a certain intellectual caché, but much less so to originality. If by “a new sort of society” we mean a world that rests on not only intellectual weight but also diverse cultural creativity, then Hutters has touched on something important for the future direction of late Qing cultural and literary studies.

In many ways, this critical import is not fully elaborated until the last section with an interesting chapter on the attempt to reign in westernization with universalism.

⁷ See Wu Jianren, “Zhi Zeng Shaoqing shu” 致曾少卿書 (A Letter to Zeng Shaoqing), *Wu Jianren quanji* 吳研人全集 (Complete Works of Wu Jianren) (Harbin: Beifang wenyi chubanshe, 1998), 10 vols., 8: 213-215.

This goes against the prevailing but oversimplified impression that westernization was equated with universalism in the early twentieth century, an assumption that explains little of the reason for their coextension in Chinese intellectual discourse. In fact, as Hutters shows, there was much discussion over the comparability of civilizational differences before Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 (1879-1942) and others latched on to its pivotal importance and mobilized it for their own ends. Journalist Huang Yuanyong 黃遠庸 (1884-1915) and editor of *Dongfang zazhi* 東方雜誌 (Eastern Miscellany), Du Yaquan 杜亞泉 (1873-1933), were careful to distinguish their critique of Chinese civilization from an embrace of western superiority. Raising the issue to the level of universalism rather than cultural and national differences, they emphasized humanism as the foundational challenge to modern China. How the polarization of cultures was lifted from this larger preoccupation is the transition that holds the key to understanding the discursive power of the late Qing and Republican China.

To capture the pulse of change, Hutters returns us to literature by bringing to light a novel little analyzed in western scholarship, Zhu Shouju's 朱瘦菊 *Xiepu chao* 歇浦潮 (The Shanghai Tide). First serialized in 1916, its publication coincides the tumultuous period of increasing urban criminality and capitalistic production in the city of Shanghai. It chronicles the corruption of moral life and the corrosion of traditional values in the face of the widespread crass adaptation of western novelties, including concepts such as "freedom" and "civilization." Though little is known of its author, we do know that, apart from authoring three other epic novels, he was a pioneering figure in Chinese cinema. His visual lyricism, as Hutters notes, sometimes slips into his narrative style, creating rhythmic, breathless sequences that describe the immediacy of actions such as an automobile crashing into a street car (p. 243).

The novel itself is a serious reflection and relentless critique of the advent of the West, as was experienced through institutional and cultural changes. Hutters, however, warns against taking as the core message its ostensible pessimism. In agreement with late Qing scholar Meng Yue's 孟悅 earlier observation that China's cultural crisis was also met with a kind of deep, self-preserving mockery, Hutters emphasizes the agonism at the heart of this cultural ambivalence: "For if the immanent task facing any single person in those times of cultural crisis was to maintain the possibility of entertaining enormously challenging, complicated, and contradictory ideas, then refusing to take the ideas seriously may well be the most effective negation of an unbearable burden" (p. 249). In this remark, one may well hear the voice of Lu Xun 魯迅 (1881-1936), whose profound understanding of this burden makes him the inescapable voice of conscience in the ensuing decades of the Republic and beyond. And it is apt that *Bringing the World Home* concludes with a reflection on the crisis of figuration that constituted the central paradox in Lu Xun's writings.

This book will be of great interest to those who are new to or seasoned in the field. The range that it exemplifies both encapsulates the complexity of this crucial period and indicates the amount of uncovered ground that can be fruitfully mined by students of the late Qing. Though all ten chapters deal on a broader level with "the

coming of ‘modernity’ to China” (p. 275), they leave many more nuanced questions to be posed. How might one, for instance, find a different mode of receptivity on the level of popular, rather than intellectual, culture and fiction? The variety of cultural and literary materials from the late Qing is by no means exhausted or exclusively represented by the writings of intellectuals and reformers. The distinction between tradition and modernity was hardly any more distinct than the boundary between science and superstition. If we discern a larger preoccupation with “humanism” rather than “westernization” in the polemics between eastern and western cultures, how can we better conceptualize the coming of the West as the advent of an epistemic order that is already recognized as an alternative, rather than the universal, worldview? It may take a greater contextualization to answer these questions, but as with the works of all authoritative scholars, Hutters takes us to the point of being able to pose them.

Between Shanghai and Hong Kong: The Politics of Chinese Cinemas. By Poshek Fu. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. Pp. xvi + 202.

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一九四五年八月日本投降後，有關淪陷區影界「漢奸」通敵的新聞被炒得沸沸揚揚。一〇八位被控「通謀敵國、為害本國」的影劇漢奸名單中，除了電影紅星李麗華、陳燕燕等人，自稱與重慶政府有聯繫，並於日本投降前數月逃到安徽屯溪，遭當地軍事單位羈押數月的淪陷區知名製片／導演張善琨亦名列其中。另一方面，儘管坊間傳言不斷，但這類新聞不久即從報端消失；影界人士無一遭到司法起訴，張善琨也在重獲自由後離開中國大陸，到香港發展。在近代中國民族主義席捲一切的浪潮之下，電影與政治之間的關係顯然十分密切，但密切到什麼程度，為什麼影劇界最後沒有人被以「漢奸」名義定罪，這些都是令人感到好奇的問題。雖然作者不盡然從這個角度切入，但他的研究為我們打開了一扇窗。

本書以三〇、四〇年代日敵入侵為背景，探討二十世紀中國電影從萌芽到茁壯過程中和政治的關係。作者在上海與香港之間，拉起一道軸線，然而在這條有形軸線的背後，還有多條無形的軸線，它們也許不像上海—香港軸線那樣清晰固定，但支點的強弱與移動卻可以影響上海—香港軸線。隨著形勢轉，這些支點在不同時段，落在不同城市，從南京到重慶，從重慶到南京，再到北京。一九四九年以後，臺北也成為一個支點。過程之中，各種政治勢力都試圖透過不同手段駕馭電影、利用電影，讓電影替政治服務。但從近代中國電影製作發展史的角度，一個更關鍵的問題或許在於，政治勢力以何種方式介入或控制文化生產